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Erev and Roth (1998) among others provide a comprehensive analysis of experimental
evidence on learning in games, based on a stochastic model of learning that accounts
for two main elements: the Law of Eﬀect (positive reinforcement of actions that
perform well) and the Power Law of Practice (learning curves tend to be steeper
initially). This note complements this literature by providing an analytical study of
the properties of such learning models. Speciﬁcally, the paper shows that:
a) up to an error term, the stochastic process is driven by a system of discrete
time diﬀerence equations of the replicator type. This carries an analogy with Börgers
and Sarin (1997), where reinforcement learning accounts only for the Law of Eﬀect.
b) if the trajectories of the system of replicator equations converge suﬃciently fast,
then the probability that all realizations of the learning process over a possibly inﬁnite
spell of time lie within a given small distance of the solution path of the replicator
dynamics becomes, from some time on, arbitrarily close to one. Fast convergence, in
the form of exponential convergence, is shown to hold for any strict Nash equilibrium
of the underlying game.
JEL: C72, C92, D83.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the last decade there has been a growing body of research within the ﬁeld of
experimental economics aimed at analyzing learning in games. Unlike ﬁeld data,
experimental data allow to focus on the dynamics of the learning process of a well
speciﬁed and controlled interactive setting, where subjects are typically required to
play exactly the same game repeatedly over time, often with varying opponents.
Hence the main source of the observed dynamics is the learning process. A question
that has received increasing attention is that of how people learn to play games.
Various learning models, such as reinforcement learning (Roth and Erev (1995) and
Erev and Roth (1998) among others), belief based learning, such as various versions of
ﬁctitious play (Fudenberg and Levine (1995) and (1998) among others) and experience
weighted attraction learning (Camerer and Ho (1999) among others) have been ﬁtted
to the data generated by experiments. These diﬀerent approaches share the common
feature that they aim at providing a learning based foundation to equilibrium theory,
by relying heavily on empirical investigation of available data.
The family of stochastic learning theories known as (positive) reinforcement seem
to perform particularly well in explaining observed behaviour in a variety of interac-
tive settings. Although speciﬁcm o d e l sd i ﬀer, the underlying idea of these theories
is that actions that performed well in the recent past will tend to be adopted with
higher probability by individuals who repeatedly face the same interactive environ-
ment. Speciﬁcally, the basic speciﬁcation of a reinforcement learning model accounts
for two main elements: the Law of Eﬀect (positive reinforcement learning) and the
Power Law of Practice (learning curves tend to be steeper initially). Within a grow-
ing area of research in experimental economics, Roth and Erev (1995), Erev and
Roth (1998), Sarin and Vahid (1998), Felthovich (2000), Mookherjhee and Sopher
(1997) among others provide a comprehensive analysis of experimental results that
are shown to be well explained (ex-ante and ex-post) by these models.
Despite their wide applications, very little is known on the analytical properties of
the class of reinforcement learning models. Results to date in this area include Borgers
and Sarin (1997) who study the properties of a reinforcement model that accounts
1only for the Law of Eﬀect; Posh (1997) who analyzes a reinforcement learning model
applied to an underlying Matching Penny game; Rustichini (1999) who characterizes
the asymptotic properties of a reinforcement model deﬁned in a non-interactive setting
and Hopkins (2000) who investigates the asymptotic properties of a perturbed version
of a reinforcement learning model in a two-player setting.
This note contributes to this literature in that it studies the asymptotic behaviour
of reinforcement learning models, as well as the dynamics of their sample paths over
time. Speciﬁcally this paper shows that: a) up to an error term the behaviour of the
stochastic process is well described by a system of discrete time diﬀerence equation
of the replicator type (Lemma 1) and b) if the trajectories of the system of replicator
equations converge suﬃciently fast, then the probability that all realization of the
learning process over a given spell of time lie within a given small distance of the
solution path of the replicator dynamics becomes arbitrarily close to one, from some
time on (Theorem 1). In particular, the paper shows that the conditions of which in b)
above are always satisﬁed in proximity of a strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying
game (Remark 1). Hence, if the initial condition with which the learning process
is started lies within the basin of attraction of a strict Nash equilibrium, then the
learning process converges with probability one to that Nash equilibrium.
The objective of the paper is achieved by modeling the learning process in terms of
a non-linear urn scheme that formalizes the stochastic process of individual learning.
As an example consider a situation where a ﬁnite number of players are to play
repeatedly over time a normal form game with strictly positive payoﬀs. Suppose
that, at each round of play, players choose actions probabilistically in the following
way: player i’s behaviour is described by an urn of inﬁnite capacity containing balls
of as many colours, as actions available; each action is chosen with probability equal
to the proportion of balls of the corresponding coulour in the urn. Furthermore,
suppose that the proportions of balls in the urns are updated through time to reﬂect
the payoﬀ obtained by players in the interaction. If player i has sampled a colour j-
ball at time t, played action j at time t and received a positive payoﬀ, then she would
add a number of colour j-balls, exactly equal to the payoﬀ that she got, to her urn.
As a result, at time t +1 , the proportions of balls in her urn will be diﬀerent from
2what they were at time t. In particular, the proportion of colour j (vs. colour k 6= j)
balls will be higher (vs. lower) than it was, since action j has been played and has
produced a positive payoﬀ (vs. action k has not been played and has not produced
any payoﬀ). This formalizes a positive reinforcement eﬀect of actions that are played,
commonly referred to as the Law of Eﬀect. Moreover, the increase in the proportion
of colour j-balls will be decreasing in the total number of balls in the urn, meaning
that an action taken at an early stage of the learning process will have a stronger
eﬀect on the proportion than the same action taken at a later stage. This formalizes
the fact that learning curves are steeper initially, a property usually labelled as the
Law of Practice.
Despite its simple formulation, this model generates quite a complex dynamics,
the study of which is the object of this paper. Understanding the analytical properties
of this widely used learning model is also essential as it allows to address some of the
issues noted below.
A ﬁrst question that arises is whether in this model players’ behaviour becomes
stationary over time: in other words will the proportions of balls in the urn that
deﬁnes choice behaviour on the part of players converge to a limit? Posh (1997)
shows that the answer to this question is ’not necessarily so’. He studies a two player
reinforcement learning model where players repeatedly play a Matching Pennies game.
His model is analogous to the one sketched above, except that, at each time t, the
total number of balls in each urn is renormalized to t. The paper shows that, with
positive probability, this learning process cycles around the orbits of the corresponding
deterministic replicator equation. It is interesting to notice that the Law of Practice
plays a key role here. To see this, consider the same model but where, at each
time t, the total number of balls in each urn is renormalized to a constant K (other
things being left equal). Hence, the relative eﬀect of the choice of an action on choice
probabilities is constant over time (or in other word there is no Law of Practice at
work). This diﬀerent renormalization makes the model analogous to the one studied
in Börgers and Sarin (1997). Although analogous in motivation, this model produces
diﬀerent results: by taking a continuous time limit, the authors show that for any
underlying game being played players will, eventually and with probability one, play
3a pure strategy. Hence, for an underlying Matching Penny game, limit behaviour
converges1.
A second question is whether the behavioural speciﬁcation of reinforcement learn-
ing model leads to optimal choices. For example, suppose there is a ’best’ action that,
when chosen, delivers the highest possible payoﬀ. Will players who repeatedly face
this environment eventually learn to choose it? Rustichini (1998) studies the optimal
properties of a single agent reinforcement learning model that accounts for the Law of
Eﬀect, as well as for the Law of Practice. He shows that in a linear adjustment model
like the one we consider, the process governing the proportions of balls in the urns
converges almost surely to the action that maximizes the expected payoﬀ (where the
expectation is taken over the states of the world), whenever such an action is unique2.
This optimality property does not necessarily carry over to an interactive setting. In
fact, a key assumption in Rustichini’s paper is that ’nature’, when generating ran-
dom states of the world, does so according to an ergodic (invariant) process; this is in
general not the case in an interactive setting, where players’ behaviour may display
phenomena of lock in and path-dependence in choices. Consistently with this intu-
ition, the already mentioned Börgers and Sarin (1997) reinforcement learning model
can, with positive probability, be locked into any suboptimal state at the boundary
of the simplex. However, by explicitly modeling the Power Law of Practice, results
can be substantially strengthened to recover optimality properties of the learning al-
gorithm. Namely, a direct implication of the results we obtain in this paper is that, if
the underlying game admits a Nash equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies, then
starting from any (interior) initial condition and from some time on, any realization
of the learning process will remain arbitrarily close to that Nash equilibrium.
A third point that is worth noticing relates to underlying games that admit mul-
tiple Nash equilibria. Issues of multiplicity are endemic in many interactive settings,
a leading example being the class of coordination games. Within the literature on
learning and evolution, traditional approaches to equilibrium selection often rely on
modeled ergodicity properties of the underlying dynamic process (as for example in
Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993)). A reinforcement learning model
is, by its mere deﬁnition, non-ergodic: players’ behaviour is path-dependent and as
4s u c hc a nb ea b s o r b e di nd i ﬀerent steady conﬁgurations of play, depending on the
initial condition with which the learning process is started. A ﬁrst step in handling
issues of multiplicity in a path-dependent setting relies on the full characterization
of the basins of attraction of diﬀerent absorbing states (or, more generally, ergodic
sets). For a reinforcement learning model that incorporates only the Law of Eﬀect
this connection cannot be easily established: Börgers and Sarin (1997) Remark 3
observes that, starting from any interior initial condition, the process can reach any
of its absorbing states with positive probability. On the contrary, this paper shows
that, once the Power Law of Practice is modeled, the learning process will converge
to a strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying game whenever its initial condition lies
within its basin of attraction, in a suitably deﬁned neighbourhood.
A point raised by the above questions is that the qualitative features of the sto-
chastic process generated by learning models based on the Law of Eﬀect are very
sensitive to whether the model also incorporates the Law of Practice. One way to
introduce a taxonomy is to notice that under the Law of Practice, the process shows
decreasing gains, in the sense that the magnitude of state transitions is decreasing
over time, while in the absence of such an eﬀect, the process exhibits constant gains,
meaning that the eﬀe c to nt h es t a t eo fe a c ha c t i o nc h o i c ei sc o n s t a n ta ta n yp o i n t
in time. Models that formalize decreasing gains typically arise endogeneously in the
framework of ﬁctitious play (see Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), Fudenberg and Levine
(1998), Kaniovski and Young (1995), Benaim (1999) and Benaim and Hirsch (1999b)).
Constant gains are instead prominent in evolutionary models (see Binmore (1992),
Boylan (1995), Binmore, Samuelson and Vaughan (1995), Binmore and Samuelson
(1997), Benaim and Hirsch (1999a), Corradi and Sarin (2000), Benaim and Weibull
(2000)).
In the reinforcement learning model we study in this paper gains decrease endo-
geneously, since the relative eﬀect of payoﬀs from the interaction on action choices
becomes smaller as players gain more experience in the learning routine. Since pay-
oﬀs are random, so are the updated weights given to payoﬀs experienced at any
given point in time. Furthermore, since diﬀerent players may get diﬀerent streams
of payoﬀs over time, each player’s learning process may display a diﬀerent sequence
5of decreasing gains. However, once such sequences are renormalized to a common
scale (which can for example be the realized sequence of gains of a given player), the
results of this paper show that any realisation of the learning process can be suitably
approximated by a replicator dynamics, whenever the solutions of the latter converge
suﬃciently fast. In fact, this condition is shown to hold in a neighbourhood of any
strict Nash equilibrium. Hence, if the learning process is started in proximity of a
strict Nash equilibrium, the probability that any of its realization lie within a small
distance from the solution path of the replicator dynamics, over a possibly inﬁnite
spell of time, becomes arbitrarily close to one, from some time on. Hence the paper
sheds some light on the asymptotics of the reinforcement learning process, as well as
on its evolution over time.
The results we obtain rely on stochastic approximation techniques (Ljung (1978),
Arthur et al. (1987), (1988)) to establish the close connection between the rein-
forcement learning process and the underlying deterministic replicator equation. By
explicitly modeling the Power Law of Practice we are able to track the magnitude
of the jumps of the stochastic process, to obtain the desired result. Since replicator
dynamics have been studied extensively in biology, as well as in economics (see for
example Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) and Weibull (1995)), results known in that
area are then used to establish that the property we require holds for any strict Nash
equilibrium of the underlying game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the reinforcement learning
model we study; Section 3 states the main result of the paper, the proof of which is
contained in the Appendix; and Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider an N-player, m-action normal form game G ≡ ({i =1 ,...,N};Ai;πi),w h e r e
Ai = {j =1 ,...,m} is player i’s action space and πi : ×iAi ≡ A → < is player i’s
payoﬀ function3.G i v e n a s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle a ≡ (a1,...,ai,...,aN) ∈ A,w ed e n o t eb y
πi(a) the payoﬀ to player i when a is played. For a given player i, we conventionally
denote a generic proﬁle of action a as (ai,a −i) where the subscript −i refers to all
6players other than i.H e n c e πi(j,a−i) is the payoﬀ to player i when (s)he chooses
action j and all other players play according to a−i.
We shall think of player i’s behaviour as being characterized by urn i,a nu r no f
inﬁnite capacity containing γi balls, bi
j > 0 of which are of colour j ∈ {1,2,...,m}.
Clearly γi ≡
P
j bi
j > 0.W ed e n o t eb yxi
j ≡ bi
j/γi the proportion of colour j balls in
urn i.P l a y e r i behaves probabilistically in the sense that we take the composition
of urn i to determine i’s action choices and postulate that xi
j is the probability with
which player i chooses action j.
Behaviour evolves over time in response to payoﬀ consideration in the following
way. Let xi
j(n) be the probability with which player i chooses action j at step n =
0,1,2.....S u p p o s e t h a t a(n) ≡ [j,a−i(n)] is the proﬁle of actions played at step n
and πi(j,a−i(n)) shortened to πi
j(n) is the corresponding payoﬀ gained by player i
who chose action j at step n. Then exactly πi
j(n) balls of colour j are added to urn
i at step n.A ts t e pn +1the resulting composition of urn i, will be:
x
i
j(n +1 ) ≡
bi
j(n +1 )
γi(n +1 )
=
bi
j(n)+πi
j(n)
γi(n)+πi
j(n)
(1)
x
i
k(n +1 ) ≡
bi
k(n +1 )
γi(n +1 )
=
bi
k(n)
γi(n)+πi
j(n)
for k 6= j
If payoﬀs are positive (as will be assumed throughout) the above new urn compo-
sition reﬂects two facts: ﬁrst the proportion of balls of colour j (vs. k 6= j)i n c r e a s e s
(vs. decreases) from step n to step n +1 , formalizing a positive (vs. negative) rein-
forcement for action j (vs. action k), and second, since γi appears at the denominator,
the strength of the aforementioned reinforcement is decreasing in the total number
of balls in urn i. We label the ﬁrst eﬀect as reinforcement and we refer to the second
as the law of practice.
It is instructive to rewrite (1) by recalling that bi
j(n) ≡ xi
j(n)γi(n),a s :
x
i
j(n +1 ) = x
i
j(n)
·
1 −
πi
j(n)
γi(n)+πi
j(n)
¸
+
πi
j(n)
γi(n)+πi
j(n)
(2)
x
i
k(n +1 ) = x
i
k(n)
·
1 −
πi
j(n)
γi(n)+πi
j(n)
¸
for k 6= j
This shows that conditional upon a(n) ≡ [ai(n)=j,a−i(n)] being played at step n,
player i updates her state by taking a weighted average of her old state and a unit
7vector that puts mass one on action j,w h e r es t e pn weights depend positively on
step n realized payoﬀ and negatively on step n total number of balls contained in urn
i. The system of equations (2) carries a direct analogy with Börgers and Sarin (1997)
reinforcement model, where payoﬀs are assumed to be positive and strictly less than
one and the payoﬀ player i gets by playing action j is taken to represent exactly the
weights given to the unit vector in the above formulation. Hence in their model these
weights do not depend on the step number n, and as a result, the formulation of their
model only accounts for the reinforcement eﬀect4.
The above reasoning is made conditional on action proﬁle a(n) being played at
step n, but this is clearly a random variable. Since actions are chosen at random and
independently by players, with each player i adopting, at step n, a mixed strategy
deﬁned by the vector of proportions of balls in urn i at step n, xi(n), we postulate
that each a(n) takes values a ∈ A with probability:
Pr[a(n)=a]=x
1
a1(n)x
2
a2(n)...x
N
aN(n) ≡ xa(n)
As a result the dynamic element of the model is captured by a sequence of random
matrix functions Π(a(n)) ≡ [Πi
j(a(n))] : A → <m×N,w h e r eΠi
j(a(n)) is the random
number of balls of colour j added to urn i at step n. In particular, at each step n,
Π(a(n)) takes values π(a) ≡ [πi
j(a)] (where πi
j(a) is the payoﬀ that player i gets by
choosing action j when the realized action proﬁle is a) with probability xa(n):
Pr[Π(a(n)) = π(a)] = Pr[a(n)=a]=xa(n)
Clearly, at any given n,
P
a xa(n)=1 ,a sw e l la s
P
a−i xa−i(n)=1 .
To lighten the notation let γ ≡ [γi] for i =1 ,....,N and x ≡ [xi
j] for i =1 ,.....,N
and j =1 ,....,m. Clearly γ ∈ <N
+ and, since xi ∈ ∆i ≡ {xi ∈ <m
+ :
P
j xi
j =1 },
x ∈ ∆ ≡ ×i∆i, i.e. x lies in the cartesian product of the N unit simplexes ∆i.G i v e n
an initial condition, [γ(0),x(0)], for any n>0, the above formalization deﬁnes a
stochastic process over the state space [x(n),γ(n)], where the dynamics of the process
is determined by the sequence of random matrix functions Π(a(n)), constructed in
relation to the normal form game G, in the way described above.
8W ec a l ls u c hap r o c e s sas t o c h a s t i cu r nd y n a m i c sU:
U ≡ ({i =1 ,..,N};[x(n),γ(n)];Π(a(n));n>0)
for the underlying game G:
G ≡
¡
{i =1 ,..,N};A
i = {j =1 ,..,m};Π
i : A → <
¢
and we denote it by {U,G}. Note that, given an initial condition [x(0),γ(0)],t h e
dynamics of the process {U,G} at any n>0 can be described in terms of a system
of stochastic diﬀerence equations:



xi
j(n +1 )=xi
j(n)+ 1
γi(n)Φi
j(x(n),γ(n))
γi(n +1 )=γi(n)+
P
j Πi
j(a(n))
i =1 ,...,N j=1 ,...,m (3)
where:
Φ
i
j(x(n),γ(n)) =
Πi
j(a(n)) − xi
j(n)
P
j Πi
j(a(n))
1+ 1
γi(n)
P
j Πi
j(a(n))
and the probability distribution of a(n) is a function of x(n). It can be easily checked
that, conditional upon a realization of a(n) the system of equations (3) reproduces
exactly the system of equations (2).
The study of this learning process is the object of this paper. Speciﬁcally, the
main result of the paper will relate the stochastic dynamics of this process to those
of the system of deterministic replicator dynamics f(xD):∆ → ∆ deﬁned by:
d
dt
x
D(t)=f(x
D(t)) (4)
where for i =1 ,...,N and j =1 ,....,m
f
i
j(x
D) ≡ x
i
j[
X
a−i
π
i(j,a−i)x
i
a−i −
X
a
π
i(ai,a −i)x
i
a]
System (4), a direct generalization of the Taylor (1979) multipopulation replicator
dynamics, has been extensively studied in the literature on evolution, usually in the
contest of large population and random matching models (see for ex. Fudenberg and
Levine (1998), Ch. 3, Weibull (1996), Ch. 3 and therein references) and has been
recently applied to the study of learning models (Börgers and Sarin (1997)).
9Lemma 1 in the Appendix characterizes the process {U,G} under the assumption
that payoﬀs are positive and bounded. It shows that, conditionally on the past, the
expected motion of this process can be decomposed in a deterministic part, f(x(.)),
which denotes system (4) for the underlying game G, weighted by random sequences
γi(.)−1, plus an error term, that is uniformly bounded. The actual process can then
by written as:
x
i(n +1 )=x
i(n)+
1
γi(n)
f
i(x(n)) + ε
i(x(n),γ(n)) (5)
for i =1 ,...,N,w h e r eε(x(.)),γ(.)) is shown to converge in the limit, for n becoming
large.
Lemma 1 introduces an important relation between the learning process we study
and the replicator dynamics, since it states that, up to an error term, the deterministic
replicator equation fully characterizes its expected motion. We may then conjecture
that the dynamics of our learning model may be suitably described by studying the
dynamics of its deterministic counterpart. To pursue this intuition, we ﬁrst notice
that the process deﬁned by (5) is characterized by N diﬀerent random step sizes:
[γi(n)]−1 for i =1 ,...,N, where we recall γi(n) denotes the total number of balls in
player i’s urn. This makes standard techniques of stochastic approximation theory
(see for example Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Chapter 4, or Benveniste at al (1990)
and Ljung (1978) among others) not directly applicable. In order to overcome this
problem, we consider a renormalized process, that we denote by {Ug,G},a n dw e
construct as follows. Suppose that, at each step n, the total number of balls in
each urn is renormalized to some positive value, g(n), leaving proportions, i.e. x(n),
unaﬀected. This is obtained by simply re-adjusting each urn composition, bi
j(n) to
bi0
j(n) in such a way as to ensure that:
x
i
j(n) ≡
bi
j(n)
γi(n)
=
bi0
j(n)
g(n)
for all i =1 ,....N and for all j =1 ,.....,m and leads to the renormalized urn process:
Ug ≡ ({i =1 ,..,N};[x(n),g(n)];Π(a(n));n>0) (6)
10which dynamics is deﬁned by:



xi
j(n +1 )=xi
j(n)+ 1
g(n)Φi
j(x(n),g(n))
{g(n)}
i =1 ,...,N j =1 ,...,m
where Φi
j(.,.) is as deﬁn e di n( 3 ) .
By this doing, the sequence of step sizes of the renormalized process becomes
equal to {g(n)−1,n > 0} and, as such, it is exactly the same for all players. A
standard choice used for example in Arthur (1993), Posh (1997) and Hopkins (2000)
is to take the deterministic sequence g(n) ≡ n. It turns out that the results we obtain
in this paper hold for any (possibily random) sequence {g(n),n>0},t h a ti ss q u a r e
summable, but not summable satisfying the following Assumption:
Assumption {g(n),n>0} is such that g(n) > 0,
P
ng(n)−1 = ∞ and
P
n g(n)−2 <
∞ (with probability one).
This assumption is consistent with standard techniques used in stochastic ap-
proximation theory. We note that, since any γi(n), regarded as a sequence over n,
{γi(n),n>0}, satisﬁes this assumption whenever payoﬀs in the underlying game are
strictly positive and bounded5, we may allow for the choice of any realized sequence of
γi(n), as long as, at each step n, the urn composition in all urns j 6= i is renormalized
to this chosen γi(n) (See Remark 2 after the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix).
3T h e m a i n r e s u l t
The study of the asymptotics of the process {Ug,G} naturally involves a deal of tech-
nicalities. Before proceeding to state the main result of this paper, we ﬁnd it useful
to place it in the contest of results already available in the literature on stochastic
approximation that have found application to the study of learning dynamics.
First, the results of Arthur et al. (1988) (Theorem 2) applied to our setting
guarantee that the learning process converges almost surely to a random vector with
support given by the set of rest points of the replicator dynamics6, i.e. the set:
DR ≡ {x ∈ ∆ | f(x)=0 }
11whenever this consists of isolated points. As it is well known, this set typically includes
all the Nash equilibria of the underlying game G,a sw e l la sa l lt h ev e r t i c e so ft h e
simplex ∆. Results on ‘attainability’ (i.e. convergence with positive probability to a
given rest point) within this literature (Arthur et al. (1988), Pemantle (1990)) apply
only to interior solutions, and are not of straightforward extension to the boundaries
of the simplex ∆.
Suﬃcient conditions that guarantee that the process does not oscillate between
diﬀerent isolated rest points in DR typically require the existence of a Ljapunov func-
tion for the system (4). Theorem 1 of Ljung (1978) provides convergence conditions,
that do straightforwardly apply to our setting whenever a Ljapunov function can be
identiﬁed. Hence, convergence of the reinforcement learning process obtains for wide
classes of underlying games (see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) and Weibull (1995)
among others on the study of Ljapunov convergence for some classes of games).
Theorem 2 of Ljung (1978) details conditions under which the process converges
with probability one to the subset of stable rest points, i.e. the set:
DS ≡ {x ∈ ∆ | f(x)=0and the Jacobian Df(x) has
only eigenvalues with strictly negative real part}
This set is particularly important in the study of the properties of the reinforce-
ment learning model when applied to an interactive setting, since it consists of all,
and only those, strict Nash equilibria of the underlying game. Unfortunately, the
result of Ljung (1978) is not easily applicable to our reinforcement learning model (in
particular condition D1 of Ljung (1978) cannot be easily checked).
As described below, whenever it applies, our result relates the trajectories of
the system of replicator dynamics (4) to the asymptotic paths of the reinforcement
learning model deﬁned by (3). By doing this, we are able to show that, provided the
process is started within the basin of attraction of an asymptotically stable rest point
(and any strict Nash equilibrium is as such), the probability with which such a rest
point is reached can be made arbitrarily close to one.
Let I = {nl | l ≥ 0} be a collection of indices such that 0 <n 0 <n 1 < .... < nl<
.... .L e t x(n0),x(n1),.....x(nl),.... denote the realizations of the stochastic process
12( 3 )a ts t e p sn0,n 1,.....,nl,..... . Consider the renormalized process {Ug,G} deﬁned
by (6) and introduce the following ﬁctitious time scale: let tl =
nl−1 P
k=n0
g(k)−1 and
∆tl = tl+1 − tl. Consider the collection of points {(x(nl),t l) | nl ∈ I}. Suppose also
that the solution of the system of diﬀerential equations (4), started at time t0 with
initial condition equal to x(n0) is plotted against the same time scale and labelled as
xD(t,t0,x(n0)) in the picture that follows.
The main result of this paper estimates the probability that all points x(nl) for
nl ∈ I simultaneously are within a given distance ε from the trajectory of the so-
lution of the system of diﬀerential equations. In words, Theorem 1 shows that, if,
and whenever, the solutions of the system of diﬀerential equations (4) converge suﬃ-
ciently fast, there exists constants ε,n that depend on the payoﬀs of the game, such
that, for ε < ε and n0 > n, the probability that all realizations of the process in
I simultaneously lie in an ε-band of the trajectory of the ODE, becomes arbitrarily
small, after time n.
13Theorem 1 Consider the stochastic process {Ug,G} (deﬁned by system (6)). Suppose
payoﬀso fG are bounded and strictly positive. Let the system of ODE (4) denote a
system of deterministic replicator dynamics and xD(t,t0,x) denote any time t ≥ 0
solution, when the initial condition is taken to be x at time t0. Suppose that the
following property holds over a compact set D ⊆ ∆:
¯
¯x
D(t + ∆t,t,x + ∆x) − x
D(t + ∆t,t,x)
¯
¯ ≤ (1 − λ∆t)|∆x| (7)
with 0 < λ < 1 and |.| denoting the Euclidean norm.
Then, for all x(n0) ∈ D, there exists constants C,ε,n that depend on the game G,
such that, for ε < ε and n0 > n:
Pr
·
sup
nl∈I
¯
¯x(nl) − x
D(tnl,t n0,x(n0)
¯
¯ > ε
¸
≤
C
ε2
N X
j=n0
1
g(j)2 (8)
for nl ∈ I = {n0,n 1,...... N},w h e r eN =s u p I nl.
The above Theorem shows that the learning process stays close to the correspond-
ing trajectory of the replicator dynamics with higher probability as n0 increases, for a
given ε. The intuition behind the result is that the common gain sequence g(.)−1 of
the process {Ug,G}c a nb er e s c a l e di ns u c haw a ya st og u a r a n t e et h a tt h ep r o c e s sx(.)
stays close to xD(.) with an arbitrary high degree of precision. Notice that, since the
RHS of inequality (8) is square summable, the statement holds for any N, possibly
inﬁnite.
Next, condition (7) is shown to hold for any strict Nash equilibrium of the under-
lying game G:
Remark 1 Let x∗ be a strict Nash equilibrium of G and denote its basin of attraction
by:
B(x
∗) ≡ {x ∈ ∆ | lim
t→∞
x
D(t,t0,x)=x
∗}
Then there exist an open set Br ≡ {x ∈ ∆ || x − x∗| <r } ⊆ B(x∗) such that condition
(7) stated in Theorem 1 holds in Br.
14A straightforward implication of the above Remark is that if the stochastic process
{Ug,G} is started in a suitably deﬁned neighbourhood of a strict Nash equilibrium,
then the probability with which the process converges to that Nash equilibrium can
be made arbitrarily close to one.
3.1 Outline of the Proof of Theorem 1
The main result relies on a series of Lemmas.
As already mentioned, Lemma 1 shows that, whenever payoﬀsa r ep o s i t i v ea n d
bounded, the motion of the stochastic system xi(n) is driven by the deterministic
system of fi(x(n)), rescaled by a random sequence γi(n)−1, up to a convergent error
term. The key to the proof of convergence is the coupling of the error term with
the sum of a supermartingale and a quadratically integrable martingale, deﬁned in
relation to the sigma-algebra generated by {xi(k),γi(k);k =1 ,...,n}.L e m m a 1
applied to {Ug,G} allows us to re-write the process as:
x
i(j(n)) = x
i(n)+
j(n)−1 X
s=n
1
g(s)
f
i(x(s)) +
j(n)−1 X
s=n
ε
i(x(s)),g(s))
for j(n) ≥ n+1, where the last term can be made arbitrarily small by an appropriate
choice of n, since it is the diﬀerence between two converging martingales.
Lemma 2 then proceeds to show that if the process {Ug,G} is, at step n of its
dynamics, within a small ρ-neighbourhood of some value x,t h e ni tw i l lr e m a i nw i t h i n
a ρ-neighbourhood of x f o rs o m et i m ea f t e rn. As such, Lemma 2 provides information
about the local behaviour of the stochastic process x(.) around x0,b yc h a r a c t e r i z i n g
an upper bound to the spell of re-scaled time within which the process stays in a
neighbourhood of x0.
The intuition used to derive global results runs as follows. Suppose time t re-
a l i z a t i o no ft h ep r o c e s s ,x0, belongs to some interval A. Within a time interval ∆t
two factors determine the subsequent values of the process: a) the deterministic part
of the dynamics, i.e. the functions f(x(t)) started with f(x(t)) in A and b) the
noise component. If the trajectories of f(x) converge, then after this time interval,
f(x(t + ∆t)) will be in some interval B ⊂ A,f o ra l lx that started in A. Hence the
15distance between any two such trajectories will decrease over this time interval, the
more so, the longer is the time interval. According to Lemma 2, the realization of the
stochastic process will diﬀer from the corresponding trajectories by a small quantity,
say ±C, the more so, the smaller is the time interval. Hence the stochastic process
will not diverge from its deterministic counterpart if B +2 C ≤ A.I no r d e rf o rt h i s
to hold, the time interval ∆t needs to be large enough to let the trajectories of the
deterministic part converge suﬃciently, but small enough to limit the noise eﬀect.
To this aim, Lemma 3 shows that if the realization of our process x(.) lies within
ε distance from the corresponding trajectory of xD(.) at time nl, then this will also
be true at time nl+1,p r o v i d e dε is small enough to guarantee that ∆tl is
a) big enough for any two trajectories of xD(.) to converge suﬃciently, and
b) small enough to limit second order eﬀects and the eﬀects of the noise.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 1 it is then suﬃcient to estimate the probability
that Lemma 2 holds simultaneously for all nl.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper studies the analytical properties of a reinforcement learning model that
incorporates the Law of Eﬀect (positive reinforcement of actions that perform well),
as well as the Law of Practice (the magnitude of the reinforcement eﬀect decays
over repetitions of the game). The learning process models interaction, among a
ﬁnite set of players faced with a normal form game, that takes place repeatedly over
time. The main contribution to the literature relies on the full characterization of
the asymptotic paths of the learning process in terms of the trajectories of a system
of replicator dynamics applied to the underlying game. Regarding the asymptotics
of the process, the paper shows that if the reinforcement learning model is started in
a neighbourhood of a strict Nash equilibrium, then convergence to that equilibrium
takes place with probability arbitrarily close to one. As for the dynamics of the
process, the results show that, from some time on, any realization of the learning
process will be arbitrarily close to the trajectory of the replicator dynamics started
with the same initial condition.
16The convergence result we obtain relies on two main facts: ﬁrst by explicitly mod-
elling the Law of Practice, we are able to construct a ﬁctituous time scale over which
any realization of the process can be studied; second, the observation that whenever
the solution of the system of replicator dynamics converge exponentially fast, the
deterministic part of the process drives the stochastic dynamics. Both requirements
are shown to be essential to establish the result.
17Appendix
Lemma 1 Consider a Stochastic Urn Dynamics {U,G}. Suppose that x(0) > 0
component-wise, and for all i’s and for all a ∈ A, 0 < π ≤ πi(a) ≤ π < ∞.
Then the following holds:



xi
j(n +1 )=xi
j(n)+ 1
γi(n)fi
j(x(n)) + εi
j(x(n)),γ(n)) n ≥ 1
0 <x i
j(0) < 1 n =0
where:
f
i
j(x(n)) = x
i
j(n)[
X
a−i
π
i(j,a−i)xa−i(n) −
X
a
π
i(ai,a −i)xa(n)]
and:
Pr[ lim
n→∞
∞ X
k=n
ε
i
j(x(k),γ
i(k)) = 0] = 1
for all i =1 ,...,N and j =1 ,...,m and n ≥ 1.
Proof. First notice that, since Pr[Π(a(n)) = π(a(n))] =
Q
i=1,...,N Pr[Πi(a(n)) =
πi(a(n))],w ec a ns t u d yt h ed y n a m i c so fx(n) by looking at each single xi(n) separately.
Simple algebra shows that the dynamics is deﬁned by:



xi
j(n +1 )=xi
j(n)+ 1
γi(n)Φi
j(x(n),γ(n)) n ≥ 1
0 <x i
j(0) < 1 n =0
(9)
for all i =1 ,...,N and j =1 ,...,m,w h e r e :
Φ
i
j(x(n),γ(n)) = [Π
i
j(n) − x
i
j(n)
X
j
Π
i
j(n)] + δ
i
j(x(n),γ(n)) (10)
with:
δ
i
j(x(n),γ(n)) ≡−
1
γi(n)
[Π
i
j(n) − x
i
j(n)
X
j
Π
i
j(n)]


P
j Πi
j(n)
1+
P
j Πi
j(n)
γi(n)


where Π(a(n)) is shortened to Π(n).
We then study the conditional expectation E[Φi
j(x(n),γ(n)) | x(n),γ(n)] by look-
ing at the two additive components separately. Simple algebra shows that:
18E[[Π
i
j(n) − x
i
j(n)
X
j
Π
i
j(n)] | x(n),γ(n))] =
= x
i
j(n)[
X
a−i
π
i(j,a−i)x
i
a−i(n) −
X
a
π
i(ai,a −i)x
i
a(n)]
≡ f
i
j(x(n))
Also, since:
P
j Πi
j(n)
1+
P
j Πi
j(n)
γi(n)
≤
X
j
Π
i
j(n) ≤ π
Π
i
j(n) − x
i
j(n)
X
j
Π
i
j(n) ≤ Π
i
j(n) ≤ π
it follows that, for all i and for all j:
| δ
i
j(x(n),γ(n)) |≤
1
γi(n)
[π]
2
As a result, we can now write:
x
i
j(n +1 )=x
i
j(n)+
1
γi(n)
f
i
j(x(n)) + ε
i
j(x(n)),γ(n))
where:
ε
i
j(x(n)),γ(n)) =
1
γi(n)
[δ
i
j(x(n)),γ(n)) + η
i
j(x(n),γ(n))]
η
i
j(x(n),γ(n)) ≡ Φ
i
j(x(n),γ(n)) − E[Φ
i
j(x(n),γ(n)) | (x(n),γ(n)]
For n ≥ 2,f o rΞ(0) ≡ 0,a n df o re a c hg i v e ni,j we then construct:
Ξ(n) ≡
n−1 X
k=1
ε
i
j(x(k),γ(k))
≡
n−1 X
k=1
1
γi(k)
δ
i
j(x(k)),γ(k)) +
n−1 X
k=1
1
γi(k)
η
i
j(x(k),γ(k))
≡ Ξδ(n)+Ξη(n)
Let z(n) be the sigma-algebra generated by{xi(k),γi(k);k =1 ,...,n}.
19Note that:
Ξδ(n +1 ) = Ξδ(n)+
1
γi(n)
δ
i
j(x(n),γ(n))
Ξη(n +1 ) = Ξη(n)+
1
γi(n)
η
i
j(x(n),γ(n))
and since by construction, δ
i
j is bounded as in eq. (4), it follows that:
Ξδ(n +1 ) ≤ Ξδ(n)+
π2
γi(n)2 ≤ Ξδ(n)+
π2
gi(n)2
where gi(n)=γi(0) + nπ is deterministic.
Hence, we can construct an auxiliary stochastic process:
Z(n) ≡ Ξδ(n)+π
2 X
k≥n
1
gi(k)2
where the series of which in the second term converges, and show that this is a
supermartingale relative to z(n).I nf a c t :
E[Z(n +1 ) | z(n)] =
= E[Ξδ(n +1 )| z(n)] + π
2 X
k≥n+1
1
gi(k)2
≤ Ξδ(n)+π
2 1
gi(n)2 + π
2 X
k≥n+1
1
gi(k)2
= Ξδ(n)+π
2 X
k≥n
1
gi(k)2 ≡ Z(n)
By the convergence theorem for supermartingales, there exists a random variable
Z(∞) and, for n →∞ , Z(n) converges pointwise to Z(∞) with probability one.
Hence, also Ξδ(n) converges to Ξδ(∞) with probability one.
With regard to Ξη(n),s i n c eE[ηi
j(x(n),γ(n)) | z(n)] = 0, Ξη(n) is a quadratically
integrable martingale relative to z(n). Hence (see for ex. Karlin and Taylor (1975),
p. 282), there exists a random variable Ξη(∞) and Ξη(n) → Ξη(∞) for n →∞a.s..
Since Ξ(∞) − Ξ(n) ≡
P∞
k=n εi
j(x(k),γi(k)), the assert follows.
20Remark 2 Let Ω∗ be a subspace of the sample space of the process {x(n),γ(n)} such
that the assumptions of Lemma 1 hold. For a given initial condition [x(0),γ(0)],c o n -
sider a ﬁxed realization ω∗ ∈ Ω∗ and the corresponding sequence {x(n,ω∗),γ(n,ω∗)}.
Any component of the vector γ(n,ω∗) ≡ [γi(n,ω∗),i=1 ,2,...,N], regarded as a
sequence over n,s a t i s ﬁes the following:
0 <
1
γi(0) + nπ
≤
1
γi(n,ω∗)
≤
1
γi(0) + nπ
Hence:
lim
n→∞
1
γi(n,ω∗)
=0
∞ X
n=0
1
γi(n,ω∗)
= ∞
∞ X
n=0
1
(γi(n,ω∗))2 < ∞
As a result, any sequence {γi(n,ω∗),n>0} satisﬁes Assumption 2, for any i and for
any realization ω∗.
Lemma 2 Consider the stochastic process {Ug,G} under the assumptions of Lemma
1.D e ﬁne the number m(n,∆t) such that
lim
n→∞
m(n,∆t)−1 X
k=n
1
g(k)
= ∆t
Assume that, for ρ = ρ(x0) > 0 and suﬃciently small, x(n) ∈ B(x0,ρ)={x :
|x − x0| < ρ}. Then there exists a value ∆t0(x0,ρ) and a number N0 = N0(x0,ρ) such
that, for ∆t<∆t0 and n>N 0,x (k) ∈ B(x0,ρ) for all n ≤ k ≤ m(n,∆t).
Proof. By Lemma 1, for j(n) ≥ n +1 , the process {Ug,G} can be re-written as:
x(j(n)) = x(n)+
j(n)−1 X
s=n
1
g(s)
f(x
0)+
j(n)−1 X
s=n
1
g(s)
[f(x(s)) − f(x
0)] +
j(n)−1 X
s=n
ε(x(s)),g(s))
and an upper bound for x(j(n)) can be constructed as follows.
21Since the function f is Lipschitz in x:
j(n)−1 X
s=n
1
g(s)
|f(x(s)) − f(x
0)| ≤ L max
n≤k≤j(n)−1
| x(k) − x
0 |
j(n)−1 X
s=n
1
g(s)
where L is global Lipschitz constant. Hence, by letting ∆t(n,j(n)) ≡
j(n)−1 P
s=n
g(s)−1 we
obtain:
|x(j(n))| ≤ |x(n)| + ∆t(n,j(n)) | f(x
0) | +
+∆t(n,j(n))L max
n≤k≤j(n)−1
| x(k) − x
0 | + (11)
+
¯
¯
¯
¯ ¯
¯
j(n)−1 X
s=n
ε(x(s),g(s))
¯
¯
¯
¯ ¯
¯
As for the last term, from Lemma 1 we know that, for all α > 0 there exists an
n = n(α) such that for all n>n (α) with probability one:
¯
¯ ¯
¯
¯
¯
j(n)−1 X
s=n
ε(x(s),g(s))
¯
¯ ¯
¯
¯
¯
≤ α
since these are diﬀerences between converging martingales.
Now consider j(n)=m(n,∆t),w h e r em is such that limn→∞ ∆t(n,m(n,∆t)) =
∆t. Note that the number m is ﬁnite for any n and for any ∆t<∞, since
P
s g(s)−1 =
∞ and
P
s g(s)−2 < ∞ by assumption. Denote
¯
¯
¯
Pj(n)−1
s=n ε(x(s),g(s))
¯
¯
¯ by α(n) and
suppose x(k) ∈ B(x0,2ρ) for all n ≤ k ≤ m(n,∆t) − 1.
Inequality (11) states that:
|x(m)| ≤ |x(n)| + ∆t | f(x
0) | +∆t2ρL + α(n)
Hence:
|x(m) − x
0| ≤ |x(m) − x(n)| + |x(n) − x
0|
≤ ∆t|f(x
0)| + ∆t2Lρ + α(n)+ρ
22and as a result, we can choose N0(ρ)=n(
ρ
2) such that, for all n>N 0,α(n) <
ρ
2
and ∆t0(x0,ρ)=
ρ
2(|f(x0)|+2Lρ)−1 > 0 and show that, for all ∆t<∆t0 and n>N 0 :
|x(m) − x
0| ≤
ρ
2
+
ρ
2
+ ρ =2 ρ
Hence if x(k) ∈ B(x0,2ρ) for all n ≤ k ≤ m − 1, this implies that also x(m) ∈
B(x0,2ρ). By induction it then follows that x(k) remains in B(x0,2ρ) also for all k up
to m(n,∆t) − 1.
Lemma 3 Beyond the assumptions of Lemma 2, suppose that the system of ODE (4)
satisﬁes property (7) on a compact set D ⊆ ∆.S u p p o s ex(nl) ∈ D with probability
one, and xD
0 (l) ∈ D.
Then,
if
¯ ¯x
D
0 (l) − x(nl)
¯ ¯ ≤ ε, also
¯ ¯x
D
0 (l +1 )− x(nl+1)
¯ ¯ ≤ ε
for λε
2L ≤ ∆tl ≤ 3λε
2L ,w h e r e0 < λ < 1, L is the Lipschitz constant of f(.) on D,a n d
0 < ε < ε =m i n {
q
(6λ
2)−14ρL,(3λ)−12L∆t0} with ∆t0 =i n f x∈D,ρ=ρ(x) ∆t0(x,ρ) > 0
deﬁned in Lemma 2.
Proof. Let I = {nl | l ≥ 0} be a collection of indices such that 0 <n 0 <n 1 < .... <
nl<n l+1 < ..... and let ∆tl = tl+1 − tl,w i t htl =
nl−1 P
k=n0
g(k)−1. Lemma 1 states that
the value of the process at time nl+1 is given by:
x(nl+1)=x(nl)+∆tlf(x(nl)) + α(nl)
and Lemma 2 shows that, for ∆tl small and nl large, α(nl) < ρ/2, meaning that
if the process is started at x(nl),i ts t a y sc l o s et oi tf o rs o m et i m e .
Solve the system of diﬀerential equations (4) from tl to tl + ∆tl Since f(.) is
Lipschitz continuous:
¯
¯x
D(t + ∆t,t,x) − (x + ∆tf(x))
¯
¯ ≤ L∆t
2
where xD(t+∆t,t,x) denotes the solution at time t+∆t, when the initial condition
is taken to be x at time t and L is a constant.
23Now take x(nl)=x and compute the distance between the stochastic process at
step nl+1, x(nl+1), and the diﬀerential equation at time tl+1, with initial condition x
at time tl,x D(tl+1,t l,x) shortened to xD
l (l +1 ):
¯
¯x(nl+1) − x
D
l (l +1 )
¯
¯ =
¯
¯x(nl)+∆tlf(x(nl)) + α(nl) − x
D
l (l +1 )
¯
¯
≤ L∆t
2 + α(nl)
As a result:
¯
¯x
D
0 (l +1 )− x(nl+1)
¯
¯ ≤
¯
¯x
D
0 (l +1 )− x
D
l (l +1 )
¯
¯ +
¯
¯x
D
l (l +1 )− x(nl+1)
¯
¯
≤
¯
¯x
D
0 (l +1 )− x
D
l (l +1 )
¯
¯ + L∆t
2
l + α(nl) (12)
where the ﬁrst term is the distance between two trajectories of the ODE, one started
at x(n0) and one at x(nl) at time t0 and tl respectively, and the second term is the
distance between the ODE and the stochastic process at time tl+1. We know from
Lemma 2 that the last two terms on the RHS of (12) can be made arbitrarily small
by an appropriate choice of ∆tl and nl. We also know that, if the two trajectories
of which in the ﬁr s tt e r mo ft h eR H So f( 1 2 )c o n v e r g e ,t h e i rd i s t a n c ew i l lb e c o m e
increasingly small. An assumption that is suﬃcient to establish the result that follows
requires:
¯
¯x
D(t + ∆t,t,x + ∆x) − x
D(t + ∆t,t,x)
¯
¯ ≤ (1 − λ∆t)|∆x| (13)
with 0 < λ < 1.I fp r o p e r t y( 7 )h o l d s ,t h e n :
¯
¯x
D
0 (l +1 )− x
D
l (l +1 )
¯
¯ ≤ (1 − λ∆tl)
¯
¯x
D
0 (l) − x(nl)
¯
¯
and as a result, inequality (12) can be rewritten as:
¯
¯x
D
0 (l +1 )− x(nl+1)
¯
¯ ≤ (1 − λ∆tl)
¯
¯x
D
0 (l) − x(nl)
¯
¯ + L∆t
2
l + α(nl) (14)
We can now show that, if x(nl) lies in an ε-neighbourhood of the trajectory of the
ODE, so will x(nl+1), for a suitable choice of ε and ∆t.
Under the assumptions of this Lemma, inequality (14) yields:
¯
¯x
D
0 (l +1 )− x(nl+1)
¯
¯ ≤ (1 − λ∆tl)ε + L∆t
2
l + α(nl)
24By Lemma 2 α(nl) <r (ε) ≡ λ2ε23
4L <
ρ
2,w h i c hh o l d sf o r0 < ε <
q
4ρL
6λ2 as assumed.
Hence:
(1 − λ∆tl)ε + L∆t
2
l + α(nl) ≤ ε − λ∆tlε + L∆t
2
l +
λ
2ε23
4L
= ε + L
·µ
∆tl −
λε
2L
¶µ
∆tl −
3λε
2L
¶¸
< ε
as stated.
We also need to show that for λε(2L)−1 ≤ ∆tl ≤ 3λε(2L)−1, ∆tl also satisﬁes
Lemma 2, i.e. ∆tl < ∆t0(x,ρ) for all x ∈ D. The radius ρ depends on x and is a
measure of how fast f(x) changes in a neighbourhood of x.S i n c ef(x) is Lipschit z
and D is compact, this radius will have a positive lower bound, as x moves in D.L e t
this be ρ > 0. Hence:
∆t0 =i n f
x∈D
∆t0(x) ≡ inf
x∈D
µ
ρ
2[|f(x)| +2 Lρ]
¶
> 0
and since ε < (3λ)−12L∆t0 by assumption, the assert follows.
Proof of Theorem 1
To proof the Theorem we need to estimate the probability that Lemma 2 holds
for all nl ∈ I. To this aim note that:
Pr
·
sup
nl∈I
¯
¯x(nl) − x
D
0 (l)
¯
¯ ≤ ε
¸
=P r
·
sup
nl∈I
α(nl) <r (ε)
¸
where, as before xD
0 (l) ≡ xD(tl,t 0,x(n0)).
From Lemma 2:
α(nl) ≡ |ε(x(nl),g(nl))| ≡
¯ ¯
¯
¯
¯
nl X
k=n0
ε(x(k),g(k)) −
nl−1 X
k=n0
ε(x(k),g(k))
¯ ¯
¯
¯
¯
and from Lemma 1:
E[ε
i
j(x(k),g(k)] ≤
π2
g(k)2
As a result:
α(nl) ≤
√
NMsup
i
sup
j
ε
i
j(x(k),g(k) ≤
√
NM
π2
g(nl)2
E[α(nl)] ≤
√
NM
π2
g(nl)2
25By Chebyshev’s inequality:
Pr[α(nl) >r (ε)] ≤
√
NM
r(ε)
π2
g(nl)2
Hence:
Pr[α(nl) ≥ r(ε);nl >n 0,n l ∈ I] ≤
C
ε2
N X
j=n0
1
g(j)2
where C =( 3 λ
2)−14L
√
NMπ2 since r(ε) ≡ (4L)−1λ
2ε2. In the statement of the
theorem n = N0(ρ),d e ﬁned in Lemma 2 and ε =m i n {(3λ)−12L,
p
(6λ)−14ρL} as
from Lemma 3.
Proof of Remark 1
To prove the statement we need to show that every strict Nash equilibrium satisﬁes
condition (7), i.e.:
¯
¯x
D(t + ∆t,t,x + ∆x) − x
D(t + ∆t,t,x)
¯
¯ ≤ (1 − λ∆t)|∆x| (15)
This condition holds if the system of ODE (4) admits the following quadratic Ljapunov
function (see, for example, Ljung (1977)):
V (∆x,t)=|∆x|
2 (a)
d
dt
V (∆x,t) < −C |∆x|
2 C>0 (b)
Suppose x∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium and w.l.g. let x∗ =0 . Consider the
linearization of the system (4) around x∗ =0:
d
dt
x
D(t)=Ax + g(x)
where A ≡ Df(x)|x∗=0 denotes the Jacobian matrix of f(x) at x∗ and limx→0
g(x)
|x| =0 .
From Ritzberger and Weibull (1995), Proposition 2, we know that a Nash equilibrium
is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics if and only if it is strict. Hence
we also know that all the eigenvalues of A at x∗ have negative real part and (see for
example Walter (1998), p. 321) we can consider the following scalar product in <Nm:
hx,yi =
∞ Z
0
(e
Atx,e
Aty)dt
26and choose:
V (x,t)=hx,xi
which satisﬁes condition (a). The scalar product (4) also satisﬁes condition (b), since:
d
dt
V (x,t) ≤−|x|
2 +2hx,g(x)i ≤−|x|
2 +2
p
hx,xi
p
hg(x),g(x)i
By the equivalence of norms in <N,t h e r ee x i s t sac>0 s.t.
p
hx,xi ≤ c|x|.F o r
r>0, consider an open ball Br = {x ∈ ∆ : |x| <r } such that Br ⊂ D and
|g(x)| ≤ (1/(4c2))|x| in Br. Then:
d
dt
V (x,t) ≤−|x|
2 +2 c
2 |x||g(x)| ≤−
1
2
|x|
2 ≤−
1
2c2V (x,t) in Br
which shows that condition (b) holds.
27Notes
1A result along these lines is also obtained in Beggs (2001), where the author shows that strategies
converge in constant-sum games with a unique equilibrium and in 2-by-2 games also if they are mixed.
2Rustichini’s result is of interest as it also indirectly complements the literature on non-linear
urn processes (see for example Arthur et al. (1988a), Pemantle (1990) and the application of the
latter in Benaim and Hirsh (1999), Theorem 5.1) by providing suﬃcient conditions for attainability
and unattainability of ﬁxed points at the boundary of the simplex.
3We hereby assume that each player’s action space has exactly the same cardinality (i.e. m).
This is purely for notational convenience.
4One immediate relation between Börgers and Sarin (1997)’s model and the one we study, can
be drawn as follows. Let f(x,Π) denote a standard discrete time system of replicator equations
for an underlying game with strictly positive payoﬀ functions Π.A ts t e pn of the repetition of the
game, suppose γi(n)=n for all is and consider the following renormalization of the payoﬀso ft h e
game:
e Π ≡
Π
n + Π
: A → (0,1)
These renormalized payoﬀs clearly satisfy Borgers and Sarin’s assumption; hence their result of
Section 2 applies and the expected motion of the system (2), conditional upon step n being reached
is given by:
E[x(n + 1) | x(n)=x,γ(n)=n]=x + f(x, e Π)
i.e. is given by a replicator dynamics in the renormalized variables e Π. It is worth noticing
that, since asymmetric replicator dynamics are not invariant under positive aﬃne transformations
of payoﬀs, in general, the solution orbits of f(x, e Π) diﬀer from those of f(x,Π). However, since:
Π
n + Π
=
Π
n
−
Π2
n2 + nΠ
the renormalization is the sum of a °(n−1) c o m p o n e n tt h a ta ﬀects all payoﬀs for all players in
the same fashion, and hence only alters the speed at which the state moves along the orbits, and
a °(n−2) component which is instead payoﬀ speciﬁc. Hence, up to an °(n−2) error term, the
expected increment of the process, x,g i v e nx(n), is given by n times f(x,Π), i.e.:
E[xi(n + 1) | x(n)=x,γ(n)=n]=xi +
1
n
fi(x,Π)+°(n−2)
5If, for any proﬁle of actions a, 0 < π ≤ πi(a) ≤ π < ∞, then the random variable γi(n) is such
that:
γi(0) + nπ ≤ γi(n) ≤ γi(0) + nπ
28for any n, with probability one.
6Convergence in the sense that:
inf
x∈DR
|x(t) − x| → 0 for t →∞
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